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October 12, 2011

I’m going to do a new blog series on “Startup Jargon”.  There are some words that I hear all the time as a VC – both spoken by fellow investors and by entrepreneurs.  They are said so often that they have almost lost their meaning, and I find that unfortunate since many of these words reflect very insightful and important concepts.  It’s too bad that they get bastardized and used loosely and inappropriately.

So, I thought I’d do a little cliff-notes summary of some of these terms.  I’m not claiming any original IP, but hopefully will be able to pull together some good thinking on these subjects and add some precision to these words.  Some of the concepts/phrases I’ll  cover are:

  • Disruptions
  • Pivot
  • Viral
  • We’re not raising money…

I hope to add a few more as things progress, so please share your suggestions!

So, the first topic I want to bring up is “Disruption”

You hear people say “This is truly disruptive!”, “I’m looking for disruptive companies”, “We want to disrupt this market”, etc.

Aside from the actual definition of “Disruption” the word received a turbo-shot of in-vogue-ness as the work of Clay Christensen became popularized.  His seminal work, “The Innovators Dilemma”, talks about the concept of disruptive innovation.  Christensen defines disruptive innovation as:

“A process by which a product or service takes root initially in simple applications at the bottom of a market and then relentlessly moves ‘up market’, eventually displacing established competitors.”

The underlying concept is that most industry incumbents are successful at delivering “Sustaining Innovations.”  These are like product improvements that satisfy existing groups of customers and improve against vectors that a company’s biggest customers care about the most.

The idea behind a disruptive innovation is that there are a whole host of other potential customers that might care about completely different attributes of a product or service.  The incumbents have a hard time addressing these customers because

  • It’s perceived to be a trivial problem
  • The target customer group seems too small
  • Delivering against those attributes would mean failing to deliver against other attributes that their big customers care about
  • Delivering against those attributes means a service with lower margin, thus, the effort never gets approved

Not all innovations are “disruptive innovations” by this definition.  “Disruptive Innovation” is not a catch-all for any innovative proposition that seems big and different.  Instead, it’s talking about a very specific kind of innovation that is made possible by very specific market dynamics.

How Does One Know If Something is Really Disruptive?

Based on Christensen’s work, there are certain things that you almost always see in disruptive innovations.  These are two questions that I’m asking myself when I hear the word “Disruption”.

Question #1: Are you going after non-consumers or low-end customers?

In disruptive innovations, the target customers are either non-consumers of existing alternatives or the unattractive customers of the incumbents.  You sometimes hear the phrase “low-end disruption” because the innovative company looks like a low-end product and targets the unattractive users of the bigger companies.  Let’s take the blogging CMS world for example.  WordPress is arguably the incumbent in this space.  They focus on tools that large scale publishers and/or bloggers use.  Tumblr, on the other hand, initially focused on the many casual bloggers that wanted to get started in blogging, but quickly abandoned their wordpress or Typepad blogs because it seemed to be too cumbersome of a task.  In a way, Tumblr was focused on WordPress’ low-end customers.

Questions #2: What attribute of competition are you going to excel at that others don’t care about?

Disruptive companies are explicitly striving for differentiation across a different plane of competition than the incumbents. You can think of a company as trying to deliver excellence across some attributes and not others.  You can’t be good at everything after all.  If you were to plot “Level of Excellence” on a Y axis and “Attributes” on the X axis in order of importance to the incumbent, you would get something like this.


 Now, the disruptive company comes along and decides “you know, I think there is a whole class of customers who only need a so-so level of attribute 1 and 2, but really really care about attribute 5.  In fact, being good at attribute 5 probably makes it really hard to be good at attribute 1, which is why the leader in the space doesn’t focus on it.”  So their graph looks something like this.

Let’s take WordPress again – while the company was trying to satisfy its larger, professional publishers by offering the most robust CMS with the most flexible features and most developer friendly tools, Tumblr came along and offered a very limited feature set that was clearly insufficient for many of WordPress’ best customers.  But they did deliver on excellent usability and design and a social reading experience through the dashboard so that even infrequent writers could get value from their service.

Parting Thoughts

  • Just because you are going after a non-consumer or low-end customer doesn’t mean that you will be disruptive in a meaningful way.  You actually do need to be right that a large market will be unlocked that care enough about the attribute of differentiation you are targeting to adopt your product en-masse and actually pay enough to build a real business.
  • Notice that in the example above, I didn’t say that Tumblr excelled on simplicity.  Simplicity is almost always an early trademark of the product of a disruptive company.  But that is not usually the root of the disruption.  Tumblr excelled at usability and aesthetics for casual bloggers, not on simplicity.  Simplicity is usually a mark of all disruptive innovation, but those products usually do become more complicated and still remain disruptive.  Put another way, disruptive products tend to be more simple initially, but simplicity does not make a product disruptive.
  • Make sure you are really targeting an area of differentiation that the incumbents can’t or won’t really focus on.  If you do, the existing players will typically win eventually.  One example of this is on the attribute of “service”.  Often, I’ll hear a startup say that they are going to win because of insanely great service.  That’s a nice idea, but I’m sure that the CEO’s of your big competitors have also read Tony Hsieh’s book and probably are trying to figure out how to deliver great service, propped up by their better cost structure and margins.  In some markets, this may be an avenue of sustainable differentiation (eg: airlines) but not in many, especially now that more and more companies are really focused on it.
  • All existing companies go through the process of going from being the disruptor to being pulled towards sustaining innovations.  So at some point, your disruptive company will in turn be disrupted by someone else.  Just as the incumbents struggled to keep pace with new entrants or dismissed them entirely, don’t think you are immune to this jus t because you are a startup.  As Ferris Bueller said: “Life moves pretty fast. If you don’t stop and look around once in a while, you could miss it.”
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  • http://twitter.com/FredPerrotta Fred Perrotta (@FredPerrotta)

    Your charts under Q#2 reminded me of the strategy canvases discussed in “Blue Ocean Strategy.” Thinking through mappings like this can really help a startup focus on their points of differentiation.

    How important is being disruptive to a startup’s success? Do truly disruptive (per your definition above) companies succeed more often than others?

    • http://www.robgo.org robchogo

      Part of Christensen’s argument is that if you are not tackling disruptive innovation, it’s much harder to compete against incumbents. But for some products, you are building something completely different, so there aren’t really incumbents to compete against. Not sure if there has been any analysis on the success rates – that would probably be pretty hard to do, actually since much of this is subjective.

  • http://www.innovativedisruption.com Paul

    @Rob. You give an excellent summary of low-end disruption. However, it isn’t the only kind — there’s also “new market” disruption, and while similar, it manifests in different ways, and some of its attributes contradict what you’ve said above. I think if you’re going to say that the jargon is mis-used, then you need to qualify this as applying only to low-end. Other than that, I totally agree with what you’re saying, and have a great deal of frustration with people misusing the language as if it were a product benefit (it’s not — customers don’t care if you’re disruptive or not). When terms are used incorrectly and on a wide-scale, they become hype and generally useless as a metaphor/framework/model for action. Thanks.

    @Fred. If a company doesn’t succeed, then it isn’t disruptive. It can’t be disruptive if it doesn’t disrupt anything. Being disruptive is important to success, because when you really have it and employ the correct management strategy to launch, distribute, publicize, market, you end up “owning” and dominating markets (becoming the new incumbent), usually with at least 40% market share for as long as the category exists (or until a new disruptor comes along) but often in a range of 60-80% market share. That kind of share makes you a profit-making machine. However, it is entirely possible to not be disruptive, but still be successful — 90% of the businesses started everyday don’t even have the potential to be disruptive. And, you only have to look at the store shelves to see lots of me-too products from profitable companies. In general though, non-disruptive innovators have to work harder to earn less profit because they aren’t as well differentiated, don’t address an unmet or under-served need, can’t change the basis for competition, are harder to describe, and don’t have an unnatural advantage (particularly in a low-end market where incumbents aren’t willing or can’t afford to go).

    • http://www.robgo.org robchogo

      Thanks Paul. Yes, I didn’t really focus on New Market Disruptions. Christensen describes new market disruptions as ones where there is a population that wants to get a job done but can’t because it’s cost prohibitive or they don’t have the skill to do it on their own. As a result, there is a population of non-consumers that would be willing to use a product that is percieved as sub-par by existing participants in the market but is useful to non-consumers.

      Out of curiosity, refresh my memory when something that applies to low-end disruption does not apply to new market disruption? I’m struggling to think of a meaningful example.

      • http://www.innovativedisruption.com Paul

        A low-end disruption can occur solely based on price if there is a sustainable cost-of-production advantage that is an order of magnitude (10x). It could simultaneously be a new-market disruption, but if it was both new market and low-end, most would identify it as low-end. Low-end disruption is almost always price-focused (though it doesn’t have to be), whereas new-market disruptions often work their magic on dimensions that customers value other than price (as you’ve noted — convenience, simplicity, ease-of-use, design).

        The iPod is a great example of this. It was introduced into a marketplace that already had many established digital music players that were aiming at lower and lower price while rapidly adding (and competing on) new features. The problem was that they didn’t solve the problem that most consumers had with digital music. Problems such as getting music converted to digital form, or downloading music legally (and without virus payloads embedded) was impossible for the mainstream market, not to mention the difficulties in managing your library, getting the music from computer to player, and the devices themselves, while getting cheaper, were not that easy to use — they were inelegant engineering monstrosities.

        The iPod won because it competed with non-consumption by a less sophisticated consumer (or one who preferred to get his tunes legally). It (together with iTunes) competed against CDs (easier to use, “1000 songs in your pocket”), music stores (inconvenient and inaccessible when compared to your computer), and made selecting and loading music trivial for the masses through superior design and seamless integration. Other pre-iPod mp3 players offered more storage space, better price, more formats, more control (if you were a techie), had replaceable batteries — i.e. were superior in ways that the segment that bought them valued. But, along with that came complexity, a requirement for skills that mainstream users didn’t have, and they were harder to use. As a result, the iPod did not bother to compete on price, and did not compete against existing mp3 players (used at the time by a tech-savvy and predominantly very young niche segment), and even today sustains a higher price point than the alternatives while maintaining over 70% market share.

        An interesting apparent anomaly/contradiction here: in one market — the existing mp3 player market pre-iPod — the iPod would be considered a sustaining innovation, because although it did away with many of the features that exceeded the needs of existing mp3 consumers, it also improved on most aspects of the digital music experience and was offered at a higher price (typically qualities of sustaining innovations). However, since Apple never actually positioned for or targeted that segment, but rather solved all the problems that mainstream users had at a price they were willing to pay, they did disrupt traditional music formats, distribution, sales, industry structure and pricing in a way that mp3 players never could. A subtle point — that you can be either a sustaining or a disruptive innovation depending on how you position and which features are essential to the market you’re targeting. The other mp3 players couldn’t match the iPod on most of the key attributes that mainstream users valued, from hardware/software integration, plug-and-play with iTunes, simplicity, design elegance (i.e. fashion statement), and especially ease-of-use — and Christensen’s model predicts this as well, since he notes that when the technology is not sufficiently well advanced that the different parts of a solution interface seamlessly, disruption favors vertical integrators who can deliver (and control) all parts of the solution. In fact, most of Apple’s big successes have been new market disruptions, priced above what analysts perceive to be the competition, but what consumers perceive to not fulfill the real need, and therefore not competitive at all.

        One thing that I should have pointed out in my original comment, but seems even more relevant now is that disruption isn’t about product or technology, but about segmentation, positioning, pricing, distribution, business model i.e. it’s about marketing. The product or technology is often an enabler of targeting the unmet or underserved needs of a market, but in and of itself is not sufficient to disrupt, and many “technically superior” products fail because they don’t realize this. Christensen spends very little time on this, or assumes it in his books, but the reality is that marketing is at the core of disruptive innovation, and I think it’s one reason why many tech-oriented entrepreneurs fail to get it, or confuse the term “disruptive” with other notions such as “breakthrough” or “vastly superior” or “best available”.

      • http://twitter.com/rick_mueller Rick Mueller (@rick_mueller)

        Hey Rob,

        Low-end is easier to differentiate from new-market if you think of performance attributes as planes rather than points. (There’s a diagram acceptable for visualization at http://sephskerritt.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/new-market-disruption.jpg).

        The clearest example is Christensen’s own minimill example, where (once there was enough scrap steel around to make recycling worthwhile), the minimills leveraged this fact and started making rebar that was just as good as the rebar made by the intergrated mills, but at a much lower price. And while the miinimills couldn’t make anything but rebar at first, by doing so they stole enough of the business that integrated mills were counting on to pay part of fixed costs, that it made the rest of their products appear to be less profitable than before.

        At the same time, the minimills were reinvesting their profits and experience in learning how to make better grades of steel using that same cheap scrap, and when they got good enough at it to market it, they did so, once again at a far lower cost than that which the integrated mills could match (particularly since their cost basis for that steel had increased once the rebar was no longer part of their mix). This happed again and again until only the minimills remained and the Disruption of integrated steel making (meaning the elimination of the prior dominance of that indstry) was complete.

        The important point here is that market segment domination is not Disruption (particularly when achieved through reproducible means). Industry domination (achieved by a scalable techological advantage) through means which cannot be reproduced by the incumbent is what characterizes Disruption – and the benefits that go with it (such as an inherent competitive advantage to the new incumbents until the next Disruption comes about).

        Hope that helps and thanks for the opportunity to explain.

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  • noname nowhere

    Tumblr – Aren’t usability and aesthetics subset of Simplicity?

    37signals – simple…less features and functions

    • point0

      I’d say no. Simplicity is a tactic of usability. But not the only one. Something simple isn’t necessarily usable.

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